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CASENOTE 
EDWARDS v. ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP: 
THERE IS NOT A "NARROW-
RESTRAINT" EXCEPTION TO 
CALIFORNIA'S PROHIBITION OF 
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS, 
AND A GENERAL RELEASE MAY NOT 
MEAN WHAT IT SAYS 
BRADFORD P. ANDERSON· 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 7, 2008, the California Supreme Court issued a vital 
enunciation of State Law in the decision of Edwards v. Arthur Andersen 
LLP.l The court explicitly rejected the existence of any "narrow-
restraint" exception to California's prohibition against noncompetition 
agreements2 under California Business and Professions Code section 
16600? 
The majority also stated that a general release "does not encompass 
nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity 
protection of [Labor Code section] 2802,'''' even if the express language 
• Law Lecturer, Graduate Business Programs, California Polytechnic State University, 
Orfalea College of Business, San Luis Obispo, California; J.D. State University of New York at 
Buffalo, magna cum laude, 1987; B.A. Purdue University, with highest distinction, 1984. Active 
member of California Bar. 
I Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008). 
2 Id. at 292-93. 
3 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Westlaw 2008). 
4 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 296. 
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of the contract is all-encompassing.5 
The Edwards Court's rejection of a "narrow-restraint" exception 
brings needed certainty to interpretation of Business and Professions 
Code section 16600. However, the court's construction of the general 
release in Edwards may prove to dilute the benefit of nonwaivable 
protections, as employees could find it too time-consuming and costly to 
litigate what is, and what is not, effectively and actually released.6 
I. THERE Is NOT A NARROW-RESTRAINT EXCEPTION TO CALIFORNIA 
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 16600 
In 1872, the California legislature enacted the predecessor provision 
to today's Business and Professions Code section 16600,1 which states: 
"Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is 
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any 
kind is to that extent void."s This allows an employee to leave one 
employer for another, even if the new employer is a competitor. 9 The 
only exceptions to section 16600 are clearly expressed by statutory 
provisions that pennit "noncompetition agreements in the sale or 
dissolution of corporations ([California Business and Professions Code] 
§ 16601), partnerships (ibid.; [California Business and Professions Code] 
§ 16602), and limited liability corporations ([California Business and 
Professions Code] § 16602.5).,,10 
Prior to the California Supreme Court decision in Edwards, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had clouded the 
clear statutory language of section 16600 by peppering its interpretation 
of the statute with a "narrow-restraint" exception. II The Ninth Circuit 
asserted that "narrow restraints" on employment were permissible,12 and 
5 See id. at 294 (text of release). 
6 [d. at 299 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). 
7 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Westlaw 2008). 
8 [d. 
9 See Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513,517 (Cal. 2004) ("[I]t has long been the public policy 
of our state that '[a] fonner employee has the right to engage in a competitive business for himself 
and to enter into competition with his former employer ... provided such competition is fairly and 
legally conducted"') (quoting Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 148 P.2d 9, 13 (Cal. 
1944». 
10 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290-91. 
II [d. at 292-93. 
12 [d.; see also IBM Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.l999) (upholding agreement 
mandating that employee would forfeit stock options if employed by competitor within six months 
of leaving employment); Campbell v. Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 817 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 
1987) (stating that CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 is inapplicable "where one is barred from 
pursuing only a small or limited part of the business, trade or profession"). 
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that section 16600 precludes only an absolute, total, and complete 
restriction on employment. \3 The Ninth Circuit's "narrow-restraint" 
exception is akin to a thesis that "a little bit of violating the law is 
okay.,,14 
In Edwards, Mr. Edwards was a certified public accountant and 
served as a Tax Manager for the Los Angeles office of Arthur 
Andersen. 15 At the time of joining Arthur Andersen in 1997, Mr. 
Edwards's employment offer was made contingent upon signing a 
noncompetition agreement that stated as follows: 16 
If you leave the Finn, for eighteen months after release or 
resignation, you agree not to perfonn professional services of the type 
you provided for any client on which you worked during the eighteen 
months prior to release or resignation. This does not prohibit you from 
accepting employment with a client. 
For twelve months after you leave the Finn, you agree not to solicit 
(to perfonn professional services of the type you provided) any client 
of the office(s) to which you were assigned during the eighteen 
months preceding release or resignation. 
You agree not to solicit away from the Finn any of its ~rofessional 
personnel for eighteen months after release or resignation. I 
The U.S. government indicted Arthur Andersen, Mr. Edwards's 
employer, in March 2002. Thereafter, Andersen announced that it would 
halt its accounting practice and sell off other practice groups, and that 
HSBC USA, Inc., would purchase a portion of Andersen's tax practice, 
including Mr. Edwards's group. IS 
13 See JBM. 191 F.3d at 1040 ("Although [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600] does not except 
'reasonable' restraints of trade, it 'only makes illegal those restraints which preclude one from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business.' Thus a contract is valid, despite a restriction on 
competition, if the promissor is 'barred from pursuing only a small or limited part of the business, 
trade or profession .... "') (quoting Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 714, 716 (Ct. 
App. 1964». 
14 Bradford P. Anderson, Complete Harmony or Mere Detente? Shielding California 
Employees from Non-Competition Covenants, 8 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.1. 8, 27 (2007) (Nowhere does 
Section 16600 allow seemingly minor or narrow restraints. Nowhere does Section 16600 contain a 
bright line of an absolute, total, and complete preclusion from a lawful trade or profession. Instead, 
the language of the statute prohibits one from being "restrained from engaging in a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind .... "). 
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When Mr. Edwards was offered employment by HSBC in July 
2002, the offer was coupled with a requirement to sign a "Termination of 
Non-compete Agreement" (hereinafter TONC). The TONC included a 
general release of Andersen from "any and all" claims. The arrangement 
was that in exchange for the TONC, Andersen would agree to Edwards's 
employment by HSBC and release him from the noncompetition 
agreement. 19 
"Andersen would not release Edwards, or any other employee, from 
the noncompetition agreement unless that employee signed the TONC.,,2o 
When Mr. Edwards signed the offer letter from HSBC, but did not sign 
the TONC, 2 "Andersen terminated Edwards's employment and withheld 
severance benefits. HSBC withdrew its offer of employment to 
Edwards.,,21 Edwards then filed a complaint against Andersen and 
HSBC for intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage. 22 
The trial court determined that the TONC did not effectuate a 
release of Mr. Edwards's right to indemnity under the Labor Code, and 
that "the noncompetition agreement fell within a 'narrow restraint' 
exception to section 16600 .... ,,23 The trial court stated that "there were 
more than enough of these wealthy folks . .. in L.A. for all CPA's to do 
the kind of work [Edwards} was doing. So there wasn't any significant 
restriction on his ability to work". 24 
On appeal, the court of appeal refused to allow section 16600 to be 
whittled away by imposition of a "narrow-restraint" exception and also 
found that the TONC "purported to waive Edwards's indemnification 
rights under the Labor Code and was therefore in violation of public 
19 Id. at 289. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
Edwards's reasons for refusing to sign the TONC included the fact that he believed it 
required him to give up his right to indemnification, which he felt was particularly important 
in light of the government's investigation into the company. Edwards also believed several of 
Andersen's clients for whom he did work would sue Andersen and name him as a defendant, 
and if that were the case he wanted to ensure he retained his right to indemnification. 
Id. at 289 n.2. 
22 Id. at 289. The complaint included Wealth and Tax Advisory Services (WTAS), an 
affiliate of HSBC, as a defendant, and also included a cause of action for anticompetitive business 
practices under the Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720-16761 (Westlaw 2008). The 
trial court sustained a demurrer to the Cartwright Act claims, which was upheld by the court of 
appeal. The Cartwright Act claims were not raised in the appeal to the California Supreme Court. [d. 
23 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 794 (Ct. App. 2006), ajJ'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008). The commentary from the trial court was not included in 
the California Supreme Court opinion, and therefore is quoted from the Court of Appeal opinion. 
24 Id. at 798 (emphasis added). 
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policy and an independently wrongful act .... ,,25 
The California Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal on 
the topic of the "narrow-restraint" issue and unanimously rejected the 
existence of any narrow-restraint exception to section 16600. 
"Noncompetition agreements are invalid under section 16600 in 
California even if narrowly drawn, unless they fall within the applicable 
statutory exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5.,,26 
[W]e are of the view that California courts "have been clear in their 
expression that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the 
state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat." Section 16600 is 
unambiguous, and if the Legislature intended the statute to apply only 
to restraints that were unreasonable or overbroad, it could have 
included language to that effect. We reject Andersen's contention that 
we should adopt a narrow-restraint exception to section 16600 and 
leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses, either to relax the statutory 
restrictions or adopt additional exceptions to the prohibition-against-
restraint rule under section 16600.27 
Although Edwards signed the noncompetition agreement at the 
beginning of his employment, the California Supreme Court noted that if 
Andersen demanded that Edwards subsequently execute the TONC as 
consideration for releasing the invalid terms in the noncompetition 
agreement, it could be deemed a wrongful act for purposes of the claim 
of interference with prospective economic advantage.28 An employer 
"cannot lawfully make the signing of an employment agreement, which 
contains an unenforceable covenant not to compete, a condition of 
continued employment.... [A]n employer's termination of an 
25 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 290 (Cal. 2008). 
26 [d. at 297. The court also stated, "We do not here address the applicability of the so-called 
trade secret exception to section 16600, as Edwards does not dispute that portion of his agreement or 
contend that the provision of the noncompetition agreement prohibiting him from recruiting 
Andersen's employees violated section 16600." [d. at 291 n.4. 
27 !d. at 293 (footnote and citations omitted). 
28 [d. at 294. 
In order to prove a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a 
plaintiff has the burden of proving five elements: (I) an economic relationship between 
plaintiff and a third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) 
defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) an intentional act by the defendant, designed 
to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to 
the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant's wrongful act, including an intentional act 
by the defendant that is designed to disrupt the relationship between the plaintiff and a third 
party. 
[d. at 290. 
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employee who refuses to sign such an agreement constitutes a wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy.,,29 
In a footnote, the court stated, "We do not here address the 
applicability of the so-called trade secret exception to section 
16600 .... ,,30 There is absolutely no statutory provision that establishes 
a trade-secret exception to California's prohibition on noncompetition 
agreements. 3 I References to a trade-secret exception occur in situations 
where courts have confused an employer's right to prevent 
misappropriation of proprietary information owned by the employer with 
a former employee's right to be employed by a competitor.32 The 
California Supreme Court's careful selection of language in this 
footnote-"so-called trade secret exception"-is perhaps a signal that 
this misnomer may, and indeed should, face the same demise as the so-
called "narrow-restraint" exception. 
II. A RELEASE OF ANY AND ALL CLAIMS DOES NOT INCLUDE 
NONWAIVABLE STATUTORY RIGHTS 
The TONC contained the following language, by which Edwards 
would have agreed to a general release of Andersen from the following: 
any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, debts, damages, 
costs, losses, penalties, attorneys' fees, obligations, judgments, 
expenses, compensation or liabilities of any nature whatsoever, in law 
or equity, whether known or unknown, contingent or otherwise, that 
Employee now has, may have ever had in the past or may have in the 
future against any of the Released Parties by reason of any act, 
omission, transaction, occurrence, conduct, circumstance, condition, 
harm, matter, cause or thing that has occurred from the beginning of 
time up to and including the date hereof, including, without limitation, 
claims that in any way arise from or out of, are based upon or relate to 
29 [d. at 294 (quoting D'sa v. Playhut, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 497 (Ct. App. 2000)). 
30 [d. at 291 n.4. 
31 Neither the statutory exceptions to Business and Professions Code section 16600 nor 
California's enactment of the Unifonn Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) embody "trade secret" exception 
provisions to override California's statutory protection against noncompetition provisions. See 
generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601, 16602, 16602.5 (Westlaw 2008); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 
3426-3426.11 (Westlaw 2008). 
32 See generally Bradford P. Anderson, Complete Harmony or Mere Detente? Shielding 
California Employees from Non-Competition Covenants, 8 V.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 8, 20-25 (2007); 
see also Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456,459 (Cal. 1958) ("It clearly appears from the tenns of the 
contract that it did not prevent defendant from carrying on a weekly credit business or any other 
business. He merely agreed not to use plaintiffs' confidential lists to solicit customers for himself 
for a period of one year following tennination of his employment.") (emphasis added). 
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Employee's employment by, association with or compensation from 
[Andersen] or any of its affiliated firms, except for claims (i) arising 
out of [Andersen's] obligations set forth in this agreement or (ii) for 
any accrued and unpaid salary or other employee benefit or 
compensation owing to Employee as of the date hereof?3 
169 
The only exceptions from the release were "claims (i) arising out of 
[Andersen's] obligations set forth in this agreement or (ii) for any 
accrued and unpaid salary or other employee benefit or compensation 
owing to Employee as of the date hereof.,,34 
The Edwards majority held, despite the all-encompassing and 
comprehensive release language, that the TONC did not serve to release 
nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the right to indemnity under 
California's Labor Code.35 The majority focused on the words "any and 
all" as being common to most release agreements.36 However, the 
majority did not address the remaining language in the TONC, such as 
the words releasing "claims that in any way arise from or out of, are 
based upon or relate to Employee's employment by, association with or 
compensation from [Andersen] or any of its affiliated firms,,,37 which 
one could easily construe to include indemnity rights that arose from the 
employment relationship. The majority further reasoned that "the 
indemnity rights in the present case are nonwaivable under Labor Code 
section 2802, and any waiver that attempts to waive those rights is 
unlawful.,,38 The court supported its rationale by indicating that it was 
seeking an interpretation to make the TONC lawful and capable of being 
enforced.39 
The court expressly preserved the right of Edwards to offer proof at 
trial that Andersen specifically intended for the TONC to release 
33 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 294. 
34 1d. 
35 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (Westlaw 2008). 
36 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 295-96. 
37 ld. at 294. 
38 1d. at 295-96; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2804 (Westlaw 2008) ("Any contract or 
agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article or any part 
thereof, is null and void, and this article shall not deprive any employee or his personal 
representative of any right or remedy to which he is entitled under the laws of this State."). 
39 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 296. The court explained its approach by stating: 
Where the language of a contract is clear and not absurd, it will be followed. But if the 
meaning is uncertain, the general rules of interpretation are to be applied. Here the meaning 
is in dispute and uncertain; we must therefore decide what the phrase "any and all" means. If 
a contract is capable of two constructions courts are bound to give such an interpretation as 
will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable and capable of being carried into effect. 
ld. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Edwards's indemnity rights, a circumstance that would enable him to 
proceed with his associated claims. The court stated: 
Our holding that contracts ordinarily are presumed to incorporate 
statutory requirements and that the TONC here was not per se 
unlawful, does not preclude Edwards from offering proof on remand 
of facts that might prove the exception to the general rule based on 
Andersen's conduct. We express no opinion concerning the merits of 
such a claim, which alleges a factual theory that is independent of the 
legal theory the trial court resolved and that we review in this 
.. 40 
OpInIOn. 
In an effort to prove that Andersen was attempting to procure an 
unlawful release of nonwaivable claims, upon remand Mr. Edwards 
might elect to offer evidence related to the negotiation of the TONC, as 
well as Andersen's procurement of an unenforceable noncompetition 
agreement from Edwards when he commenced his employment. 
III. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Kennard penned a separate concurring and dissenting 
opinion, joined by Justice Werdegar. Both justices agreed with the 
majority that the noncompetition agreement was invalid, and that there is 
no narrow-restraint exception to Section 16600. However, the dissenting 
portion eloquently identified concerns with the majority's interpretation 
of the release language in the TONC. 
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Kennard pointed out that 
[T]he majority fails to analyze the language of the TONC that most 
strongly supports Edwards's argument. The TONe did not merely 
require Edwards to release Andersen from "any and all" claims; it 
specifically required Edwards to release Andersen from "any and 
all .... losses [or] .... expenses . ... including .... claims that . ... 
arise from . ... employment .... " (Italics added.) This language 
closely tracks Labor Code section 2802, subdivision (a), which 
requires an employer to indemnify an employee "for all necessary 
expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence 
of the discharge of his or her duties . ... " (Italics added.) Thus, 
although it is true that the TONC did not use the words "indemnity 
claims" and did not mention Labor Code section 2802, it 
unambiguously required Edwards to release the precise indemnity 
40 Id. at 297 n.7. 
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rights that Labor Code section 2802 grants him.41 
Justice Kennard's opinion further nailed down the important policy 
issue of potential employee oppression by stating that: 
[T]his court should not lightly dismiss the Court of Appeal's 
conclusion that Andersen may have wanted its employees to think they 
had released their indemnity rights, although it knew that any release 
of such rights was void. As the Court of Appeal explained, quoting 
from Latona v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc. (1999) 82 F.Supp.2d 1089, 
1096: '''[D]efendant's argument, that the Agreement cannot violate 
public policy because .... it is simply a nullity, ignores the realities of 
the marketplace.... Employees, having no reason to familiarize 
themselves with the specifics of California's employment law, will 
tend to assume that the contractual terms proposed by their 
employer ... are legal, if draconian .... Thus, the in terrorem effect 
of the Agreement will tend to secure employee compliance with its 
illegal terms in the vast majority of cases. ,,;42 
Justice Kennard's opinion is solidly reasoned.43 For example, using 
a similar line of logic, one California Court of Appeal has articulated that 
"[t]he intent of the parties as expressed in the release is controlling.'.44 
Another California Court of Appeal, in its determination that a release 
encompassed all claims, reasoned that "the parties declared their 
intention to release each other from all claims ... .'.45 A commentator 
has noted that, "[g]enerally, a release should expressly designate the 
scope of the claims and rights that are being released and those that are 
being retained.,,46 Burdening an employee with the duty of proving what 
41 Id. at 299. 
42 Id. 
43 See generally, Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir., 1992) 
("There is no doubt that the language of the release is unambiguous in conveying the intent of the 
parties to release all ... claims .... "); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1463 
(9th Cir. 1986) ("The... Release firmly evidences the parties' intent to end their various 
disputes ... once and for aiL"); and Edwards v. Comstock Insurance Company, 205 CaLApp.3d 
1164, 1169 (1988) (" ... we agree with the trial court that parol evidence of the Edwards' 
undisclosed intention to retain the right to sue their insurer is inadmissible to contradict a release in 
which the Edwards unambiguously relinquish their right to pursue all claims, actions and causes of 
action .... ") (emphasis in original). 
44 McCall v. Four Star Music Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
4S Winet v. Price, 4 CaL App. 4th 1159, 1162 (1992) (The trial court granted summary 
judgment in Price's favor, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, observing that in "no fewer than three 
distinct places the parties declared their intention to release each other from all claims .... "). 
46 Howard J. Weg, Enforcing a Prebankruptcy Release of Claims and Rights, 23 Los 
ANGELES LAWYER 21 (Feb. 2001). 
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is, and is not, encompassed in a release of "all" claims runs counter to the 
underlying public policy of prohibiting releases or waivers of certain 
rights.47 
As Justice Kennard's dissent indicated, an employee wishing to 
challenge an overreaching release will be forced to engage counsel and 
undertake the time and expense of litigation. If the employee loses his or 
her challenge to the release, he or she may also be subject to paying the 
employer's legal fees and costs if the underlying contract contains a 
"loser pays" legal-fee provision.48 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Edwards, the California Supreme Court preserved important 
rights of competition and unmistakably made it clear that there is no such 
thing as a "narrow-restraint" exception to California's prohibition of 
noncompetition agreements under Business and Professions Code section 
16600. Under the Erie doctrine, which requires federal courts to accept a 
decision of the California Supreme Court as definitive on a matter of 
substantive California law, the Edwards decision should once and for all 
resolve the issue in federal court as well.49 
The majority's ruling that a contract provision releasing "any and 
all" claims does not encompass nonwaivable statutory protections may 
generate future ambiguity in the interpretation of general releases, 
causing both employers and employees to lack certainty about exactly 
what is, and what is not, being released. The majority rejected the 
imposition of a requirement that general releases in the employment 
47 See generally O'Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 85 Cal.App.4th 927 (2000) (In the context of 
evaluating an unenforceable noncompete covenant, the court examined important policy 
underpinnings. This reasoning applies to similar statutory protections, such as other rights which 
cannot be waived or released: "Therefore, if we were to agree to the construction defendants ask for, 
we would undermine the protection given to employees ... since many, if not most, employees ... 
might act according to their interpretation rather than consult an attorney to find out if their 
interpretation is correct.") [d. at 935. 
48 A "loser pays" provision provides that in the event of a dispute, the loser will pay the legal 
fees of the winning party. This is another form of oppressive conduct to prevent employees from 
asserting their rights. See, e.g., Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456, 458 (Cal. 1958): 
In the event that the Employer is successful in any suit or proceeding brought or instituted by 
the Employer to enforce any of the provisions of the within agreement or on account of any 
damages sustained by the Employer by reason of the violation by the Collector-Salesman of 
any of the terms and/or provisions of this Agreement to be performed by the Collector-
Salesman, Collector-Salesman agrees to pay to the Employer reasonable attorneys' fees to be 
fixed by the Court. 
49 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see generally 17A JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124.20 (3d ed. 2008). 
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context contain a specific list of nonwaivable statutory protections, or to 
include language such as "except as otherwise prohibited by law"so to 
clarify that nonwaivable statutory protections are outside the scope of a 
release. However, including language to make it clear that nonwaivable 
statutory protections are excluded from the scope of a release may help 
to clarify that it is not intended to overreach and extend to nonwaivable 
rights, bringing greater mutuality and certainty to the meaning of the 
release for all parties. 
50 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 297. 
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